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INTRODUCTION 
Across many sectors of Australian society, surrogacy continues to be viewed as a 
controversial mode of family formation. One possible reason for this is that women who 
carry and give birth to a child for another person disrupt normative understandings of what it 
means to be a mother, and what constitutes a family (see Riggs and Due, 2012, for a 
discussion of how motherhood is constructed in debates over surrogacy). One particular way 
in which controversy over surrogacy is voiced is via claims that surrogacy is not in ‘the best 
interests of the child’ (where children’s best interests are normatively understood as served 
by having a mother and father who conceived and birthed the child). Yet as Jenkins (1998) 
argues, such recourse to normative notions of ‘the best interests of the child’ serve ‘as a 
“human shield” against criticism’ (p. 2), due to the fact that what constitutes ‘the best 
interests of the child’ is rarely, if ever, clearly defined. Instead, claims about children’s 
interests are deployed rhetorically to bolster the position of the speaker and their own 
conception of what the category ‘child’ means, rather than necessarily being about the actual 
needs of children (Baird, 2008). 
With the above points about current controversies over surrogacy in mind, the present chapter 
focuses on one recent example of constructions of children’s ‘best interests’, namely in 
politicians’ debate on surrogacy legislation recently introduced and enacted in the Australian 
state of New South Wales (NSW). The NSW Surrogacy Bill was tabled with the stated aim of 
better managing altruistic surrogacy arrangements, which had previously been covered by 
three separate Acts:  
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1. The Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007, which prohibits onshore 
commercial surrogacy, makes commercial surrogacy agreements legally void and 
unenforceable, and requires genetic records to be kept in a central register;  
2. The Status of Children Act 1996, which contains a presumption of parentage in 
relation to children born through a fertilisation procedure in favour of the birth mother; and  
3. The Adoption Act 2000, which allows intending parents in a surrogacy 
arrangement to apply to adopt the child and thereby become the legal parents of the child.  
 
The Bill followed from an inquiry conducted by the NSW Legislative Council’s Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice. The Standing Committee held four days of public hearings 
before publishing its Legislation on Altruistic Surrogacy in NSW report in May 2009 
(Robertson, 2009). The Bill that was subsequently passed by 53 votes to 27 votes did not 
make altruistic surrogacy in New South Wales any more or less legal than was the case under 
previous legislation. Rather, the aim of the new legislation was to enable legal parentage to 
be transferred to the intending parents, and in so doing improve outcomes for women who act 
as surrogates in an altruistic arrangement, the intending parents in such an arrangement, and 
the resultant child. The Bill also clarified prohibitions on the advertising of surrogacy 
arrangements, in addition to prohibiting residents of New South Wales from engaging in 
commercial arrangements either interstate or overseas.   
 
Yet despite the relatively pragmatic focus of the Bill upon the regulation of surrogacy, much 
of the content of both the inquiry and subsequent debate in parliament was concerned with 
whether surrogacy should be allowed at all, and on numerous occasions speakers appealed to 
‘the best interests of the child’ in order to support their argument. Our interest in this chapter, 
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then, is how the category of ‘the child’ was deployed within parliamentary debate in relation 
to the Bill in ways that promoted very specific (and for the most part highly normative) 
understandings of children’s best interests.  Importantly, our interest is not to analyse 
individual politician’s attitudes towards surrogacy per se, but rather our focus is on how, as 
culturally competent individuals who are well versed in public debates over surrogacy, 
politicians justified their stance on the topic by appealing to notions of ‘the best interests of 
the child’ as a taken for granted category. Before moving on to analyse extracts from the 
Hansard for one day of the debates, we first outline in more detail the legal context of 
surrogacy in Australia. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Despite a review process initiated in 2006 by then Attorney General Phillip Ruddock aimed 
at reviewing and unifying laws on surrogacy, wide variation remains across Australian states 
and territories (see Page and Harland 2011; Millbank 2011 for detailed examinations of the 
current state of play of legislation relating to surrogacy across Australia). To summarise 
existing legislation briefly: altruistic surrogacy is legal across Australia (though there are 
some differences in who is deemed eligible intended parent and what is deemed acceptable 
reimbursement of expenses to women who act as surrogates), whilst commercial surrogacy 
arrangements within Australia are considered a criminal offence. Further, some states and 
territories (including New South Wales, as discussed in relation to the aforementioned Bill), 
ban residents from international surrogacy arrangements (Stuhmcke 2011; Page and 
Harland). Given this variation in legislation across Australia, some commentators have 
continued to call for another review of legislation relating to surrogacy (see, for example, 
Stuhmcke), particularly with regard to ambiguity over what constitutes “reasonable 
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expenses” payable to women who act as surrogates within an arrangement considered to be 
altruistic.  
 
In addition to debates concerning what type of surrogacy arrangements ought to be legal, 
there are also inconsistencies across Australia relating to who is legally allowed to be an 
intended parent, together with what rights intended parents receive in relation to the child’s 
legal parentage. In regards to legislation concerned with intended parents, Millbank (2011) 
argues that the “increasingly complex web of eligibility rules” may not in fact function to 
safeguard interests of either children or their intended parents (p. 4). Part of this is the 
product, Millbank suggests, of the fact that most of the Inquiries conducted in states and 
territories across Australia in relation to surrogacy legislation have been undertaken hastily, 
with the resulting legislation put together on the basis of abstract ideas, rather than the actual 
experiences of people involved in surrogacy arrangements. This is highlighted in differing 
legislation across Australia concerning who is able to be an intended parent (and therefore 
commission a surrogacy arrangement), where some states require that the intended parent(s) 
are heterosexual and/or in a relationship and/or are female, and with most states requiring that 
the intended parent(s) prove a ‘need’ for surrogacy or are infertile.  
 
Such debates within Australia reflect international debates over who constitutes a ‘proper’ 
intended parent (an issue reflected again in the data we examine in this chapter). Following 
Sorin and Galloway (2006), we would suggest that the child/adult dyad is constituted within 
such debates as a standardised relational pair, one that always already evokes the image of 
children as innocent and in need of protection, the corollary being that adults are those best 
placed to determine children’s best interests. Yet as Burr’s (2000) examination of the British 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (Warnock, 
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1984) indicates, not all adults are necessarily constructed as equally suitable to be responsible 
for looking after the best interests of children. Burr found that the concept of the best interests 
of the child in regards to surrogacy was used rhetorically to justify a position in which the 
only acceptable approach to conceiving children was within a two-parent, heterosexual 
relationship. Such instances of heteronormativity within parliamentary debates have also 
been seen in previous parliamentary debates within Australia, such in the Inquiry preceding 
the Sexuality Discrimination Bill (1995) (see Morgan 1997), the West Australian Acts 
Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Bill (2001) (see Summers 2007), and proposed 
changes to the Sex Discrimination Act (1984) aimed at restricting reproductive technologies 
on the basis of marital status (Smith 2003). The last two examples in particular highlight the 
use of ambiguous rhetoric concerning ‘the best interests of the child’ to justify particular 
arguments about rights for non-heterosexual people (as well as the rights of single men and 
women regardless of sexual orientation) in relation to children (including the right to adopt 
and to use reproductive technologies). In the analysis that follows, we provide another 
example of how debates over reproduction typically evoke a highly normative image of what 
an intended parent should look like, and how this reifies one family form (i.e., a heterosexual 
nuclear family where the children are born to the mother) over all others.  
 
 
METHOD 
  
Our data are the Hansard transcript of the debate that took place on 10 November 2010 in the 
Legislative Assembly of the Parliament of New South Wales, immediately prior to the vote in 
which the parliament passed the legislation. We chose the transcript of this day since it was 
the date on which the Bill was declared with amendments, and, as the final day of debating, 
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built upon previous debating on the 28 October 2010 in the Legislative Assembly and three 
other days of debates in the Legislative Council, and thus, we would argue included 
summaries of the positions of each politician in terms of the Bill. Our analysis of the data is 
based on the approach to discourse analysis described by Wetherell and Potter (1992), which 
involves the identification of interpretive repertoires as a way of analysing the content of 
discourse. Wetherell and Potter define interpretative repertoires as ‘broadly discernable 
clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or 
vivid images’ (p. 90). In addition to identifying the dominant interpretative repertoires in 
relation to constructions of children across the data set, we were interested to examine the 
ideological claims that supported each repertoire. As Billig (1991) suggests, when expressing 
their viewpoints, individuals draw upon forms of argumentation that they take to be common-
sense, but which are historically and culturally specific and ideologically loaded. Thus, as the 
data demonstrate, ideologies are dilemmatic, containing competing arguments and 
characterised by contradiction. Political debate over topics considered contentious – such as 
surrogacy – are thus excellent sites in which to identify some of the interpretative repertoires 
and rhetorical devices through which particular argumentative positions are warranted. 
 
Through our repeated readings of the dataset, passages that made explicit or implicit 
reference to children, the rights of children, and the best interests of the child in the context of 
surrogacy were identified and extracted for analysis. Extracts from individuals both in 
support and in opposition to surrogacy were included, although it should be noted that 
politicians who supported surrogacy made reference to children and their rights less 
frequently than did those who opposed surrogacy. As a result, the extracts presented in the 
analysis are not representative of all of the debate over the Bill, which included discussion 
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around a number of aspects of the Bill (such as the mechanism for transferring parental status 
from the woman acting as the surrogate to the commissioning parents).  
 
Two interpretative repertoires relating to the best interests of children emerged from the data. 
These were: 1) The best interests of children are served by having a mother and a father, and; 
2) Surrogacy is a lifestyle choice that is not in the best interests of children. In the analysis 
that follows, we examine a selection of representative extracts that highlight the deployment 
of these interpretative repertoires, each of which involve specific constructions of the 
category ‘the child’. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The Best Interests of Children are Served by Having a Mother and Father 
 
A predominant repertoire in the data emphasised the claim that all children need a mother and 
father, and that this is in children’s best interests. This repertoire includes common-sense 
notions of conventional nuclear families, along with paired contrasts between heterosexual 
and homosexual couples, and between single parent families and two parent families. 
Overall, those who drew upon this repertoire emphasised heterosexual marriage as the only 
context in which children should be raised, as the first extract indicates: 
 
Extract 1 
I believe marriage should be seen as the setting which most fully acknowledges the 
dignity of the child, and which establishes the relationship of equality between a child 
and his or her parents, and respects the child's right to enjoy an immediate and enduring 
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link with those natural parents. Surrogacy arrangements are particularly disturbing 
because they involve deliberately deciding to bring a child into existence with the 
intention of separating that child from his or her birth mother. I touch upon the 
concerns that relate, for example, to the birth mother and to the child. Surrogacy 
instrumentalises children by placing the process of their conception, birth and 
upbringing under a contract. A child becomes the object of an arrangement aimed at 
fulfilling the needs of the commissioning parents.  
 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 November 2010, 
27584 (John Aquilina, Parliamentary Secretary, Labor Party) 
 
In this extract, the speaker presents marriage (presumably heterosexual given laws in 
Australia that prohibit non-heterosexual marriage) as being in the best interests of children, 
and contrasts this with surrogacy arrangements. Specifically, the speaker constructs marriage 
as enabling a ‘relationship of equality’ between children and parents, despite the fact that the 
parent/child relationship is typically unequal, regardless of family structure (due to the fact 
that in western societies children are seen as helpless objects of care, and adults as those 
responsible for such care). By arguing that heterosexual marriage is in the best interests of 
children, the speaker implies, by contrast, that other kinds of relationships and family 
structures are not in the best interests of children. The heterosexual nuclear family is further 
depicted as being in the best interests of children by the use of positive vocabulary such as 
‘enjoy’, ‘relationship’, ‘enduring’, ‘natural’, ‘immediate’. By contrast, families created using 
surrogacy are depicted negatively, specifically with the suggestion that surrogacy 
‘instrumentalises’ children. Ironically, the speaker themselves instrumentalises children in 
this extract by relying on the discursive power of the construct of ‘the child’ as a tool to 
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support their argument. This is an example of the discursive resource of child 
fundamentalism (Baird, 2008, p. 293), in which a speaker’s argument ‘relies wholly or in part 
on an insistence on the child as an impermeable category that must be defended’. 
 
The following extract also draws upon the interpretative repertoire of children’s best interests 
are served by having a mother and father, albeit via a different formulation of the adult/child 
relationship: 
 
Extract 2 
The strongest argument for a Surrogacy Bill that resonates with me is the submission 
made in relation to child support. The argument was advanced that children could be 
excluded from the child support regime if the commissioning parents separated during 
the limbo phase of the adoption. It seems that this shortcoming in the current transferral 
mechanism cannot be overcome. It would be wrong to deny a right—a right that would 
otherwise be afforded to children who have been conceived naturally—to a child, 
simply because he or she was born in a surrogate circumstance through no fault of his 
or her own. It is in the best interests of the child to ensure that the law holds both his or 
her mother and father responsible for the child, for only they could make the decision to 
bring this child into this world.  
 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 November 2010, 
27592 (Victor Dominello, Liberal party) 
 
Contrary to the first extract in which the relationship between a child and its parent(s) is 
constructed as equal, this extract builds an account of the parent-child relationship in which 
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the parent is in a position of authority. The construct of ‘child’ mobilised, therefore, is one of 
passive innocence (‘she was born in a surrogate circumstance through no fault of her own’). 
This is in contrast to the construction of adults, who are depicted as possessing sole agency in 
the relationship, ‘for only they could make the decision to bring this child into this world’.  
 
The extract also orients to a normative family structure. That a family comprises a mother, a 
father and a child is unquestioned and unchallenged. For example, the speaker states that ‘the 
law holds ‘both his or her mother and father responsible’ and ‘only they could make the 
decision to bring this child into this world.’ Despite the fact that the debate is about surrogacy 
and many speakers acknowledged the potential for non-traditional family structures to 
emerge - such as families with two fathers - the understanding of family as constituted by a 
mother and father is so taken for granted that it is treated by this speaker as requiring no 
further elaboration. Another example of such a taken for granted assumption in this extract is 
the comparison made between children who are ‘conceived naturally’ and those who are 
‘born in a surrogate circumstance’. No attention is paid to the multiple ways in which 
conception amongst heterosexual couples occurs. Instead, the word ‘natural’ - and its implied 
counter ‘unnatural’ – is effectively deployed to implicitly construct a hierarchy of appropriate 
modes of reproduction.  
 
The following extract again repeats the repertoire that children’s best interests are served by 
having a mother and father: 
 
Extract 3 
I had trouble with the recent Adoption Amendment (Same Sex Couples) Bill 2010, 
which I did not agree to, not because I have any trouble with adults who adopt a gay 
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lifestyle, that is their right, but because I believe that the issue is not one of gay rights 
but that the fundamental rights of a child need to be acknowledged. Associated with the 
paramount rights of the child is the right of a child to have a mother and a father. In an 
ideal world every child would be cared for by a mother and a father. The law should 
take every step it can to ensure that children do have that fundamental right.  
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 November 2010, 
27595 (Chris Hartcher, Liberal party) 
This extract again links children’s best interests to family structure. Specifically, the 
importance of a heterosexual partnership for bringing up children is emphasised. Whilst the 
opening statement ‘not because I have any trouble with adults who adopt a gay lifestyle’ acts 
as a disclaimer, this is followed by a clear statement against non-heterosexual parents by 
saying that it is ‘the right of a child to have a mother and a father’. This argument is stated 
even more bluntly in the ideological claim that ‘In an ideal world every child would be cared 
for by a mother and a father’. Repetition is a powerful rhetorical device in itself, but this 
sentence also works on another level, by appealing to the common-sense ideology of ‘an 
ideal world’ that is assumed by the speaker to be commonly held amongst their audience.  
Appealing to an ideal world works to undermine the legitimate counter-argument, namely 
that many children do not have two parents (due to, for example, singe-parenthood by choice, 
divorce, death, abandonment, and other scenarios that do not occur in an ‘ideal world’). There 
is no defence or argument presented as to why a mother and a father are necessary, and thus 
the statement is presented as rhetorically incontestable. 
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The terminology of ‘lifestyle’ with reference to homosexuality is also introduced in this 
extract, thus touching on the repertoire of surrogacy as a lifestyle choice that is taken up in 
the following section. The inference of the speaker’s use of the words ‘gay lifestyle’ is that 
being gay is a lifestyle preference. The implication of this is that those who ‘choose’ to be 
gay thus render themselves ineligible to have children (under the presumption that children 
should be conceived through heterosex).  
As a whole, the extracts in this interpretative repertoire rely on the notion that children need a 
mother and a father, an argument made to speak against surrogacy as a legitimate mode of 
family formation. Whilst this is illogical as it effectively excludes heterosexual parents who 
have children through surrogacy (parents who would otherwise, it appears, be welcomed by 
the speakers on the basis of their heterosexuality), the statements made by the speakers draw 
attention to is the fact that they are not simply referring to the best interest of children as 
having a mother and a father, but more specifically they are referring to the best interests of 
children as being conceived through heterosex. This brings with it an implicit derogation of 
many family forms, an issue that is taken up more closely in the following repertoire. 
Surrogacy as a Lifestyle Choice that is not in the Best Interests of Children 
This repertoire similarly encompassed talk about family structure and the relative rights of 
parents and children, but focused specifically on the type of family that would be formed as a 
result of the surrogacy arrangement. Certain adults using surrogacy arrangements to form a 
family were described as making a “lifestyle choice”, and this was constructed pejoratively, 
as can be seen in the following extract: 
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Extract 4 
I have a significant problem with clause 21 of the bill. I am not concerned if a mother 
cannot have a child because of a medical issue. I know some fantastic people who 
would make excellent parents but for medical reasons they cannot have children. I 
support their right to seek out medical intervention to have a child that I know would be 
raised in a safe and stable relationship. What has not been explained sufficiently is the 
phrase in the bill "medical or social need". I have a real problem with what "social 
need" means. To me social need means that it becomes a lifestyle choice, and I have an 
issue with that at a very deep level. If people choose to have children, adoption is 
already available to them. However, if a woman cannot physically have a baby 
surrogacy may be an option. In principle, I cannot support people going down the 
surrogacy path when the child will be created to meet a social need.  
 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 November 2010, 
27594 (David Harris, Parliamentary Secretary, Labor Party) 
 
In this extract it is argued that surrogacy is acceptable in some situations but not others. The 
speaker constructs a binary in which the ‘need’ for reproductive assistance is either ‘medical’ 
or ‘social’. Medical need for surrogacy is constructed as clearly defined, morally trouble-free, 
and restricted to infertile heterosexual couples. For example, the speaker refers to a ‘mother’ 
who cannot have a child for medical reasons. The use of ‘mother’ rather than the possible 
alternatives of ‘woman’, ‘person’, ‘parent’ or ‘couple’ is noteworthy, and works in a number 
of ways to reinforce the construction of heterosexual infertility as a medical need for 
surrogacy. Firstly, the term is specifically female, secondly, it defines the person by her child-
rearing role (even though she has not had a child), and thirdly, as part of a standardised 
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relational pair in the context of a heteronormative society, it is implicitly accompanied by the 
category ‘father’.  
 
The use of the word ‘mother’ also works to construct people in ‘medical’ need as people who 
are familiar and comfortable to the audience, and this is contrasted with the more distant, 
impersonal, term ‘people’ to describe those who are in ‘social’ need. The speaker suggests 
that such a woman might be someone ‘I know’, which also works to create an image of the 
close and known; the ‘us’ to be compared with the ‘them’ who are in ‘social’ need of 
surrogacy. The use of positive vocabulary to describe people who meet the ‘medical need’ 
criteria, such as ‘fantastic people’, ‘excellent parents’ and ‘safe and stable relationships’ is 
another discursive strategy that allows the speaker to make a strong and effective contrast 
with the other half of the dichotomy of need.  
 
‘Social need’ is contrasted with ‘medical need’ in numerous ways. The speaker’s own views 
on each exemplify this. He is ‘not concerned’ with infertile heterosexual couples using 
surrogacy for medical need, but he has a ‘real problem with what social need means’. 
Medical need is an acceptable reason for ‘women’ to consider surrogacy, but social need is 
for ‘people’. In a further contrast, adults who ‘choose to have children’ to address a social 
need can adopt, whereas for women addressing a ‘physical’ medical need ‘surrogacy may be 
an option’. With these points in mind, it can be inferred that the implicit message of the 
statements made in this extract is that surrogacy is an option for infertile heterosexual 
couples, but not for gay individuals or couples (or indeed single fertile heterosexual people).  
 
Importantly, the language of choice is critical here. Social need is equated with lifestyle 
choice, which, as was discussed above, is a phrase that plays a powerful role in debates over 
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surrogacy by raising the implication that a ‘choice’ brings with it no rights (to reproduce). 
Notably, neither in this extract, nor in the following, is the language of choice with respect to 
reproduction applied to heterosexual couples. The phrases ‘lifestyle choice’ and ‘people who 
choose to have children’ work together to imply that people ‘choose’ to be gay and therefore 
they choose to be unable to have children. Similarly, this argument could also be extended to 
include (for example) women who are seen as being ‘career oriented’ and leave having 
children until they are ‘older’, and then may have to enter into a surrogacy arrangement. 
Again, the phrase ‘lifestyle choice’ implies that they have chosen to be unable to have 
children, and thus the line between medical and social needs could well be a blurry one. For 
the following speaker, this is what constitutes social need: 
 
Extract 5 
I also find the Surrogacy Bill 2010 difficult because, tested against the fundamental 
proposition that the rights of the child should be paramount, this legislation would 
allow adults, people over the age of 18 years, as the member for Wyong so well 
illustrated, the right to have a surrogate child simply to fulfil a social need. A social 
need is really an expression of a personal wish because there is no requirement 
financially, culturally or legally in our society that people have children. The Prime 
Minister herself is famous for her well-publicised decision not to have children and that 
is a right that is respected. Social need simply becomes a lifestyle choice and to 
subordinate the right of a child to a lifestyle choice is to me unacceptable. 
 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 November 2010, 
27595  (Chris Hartcher, Liberal party) 
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In this extract the extreme case formulation of children’s rights being both ‘fundamental’ and 
‘paramount’ maximises the role of children’s rights in the justification of a position where 
surrogacy is depicted as a lifestyle choice. The speaker equates social need with lifestyle 
choice, and in so doing builds an image of people choosing to have a child in the same way 
that they might choose consumer items. Having a child is constructed as a selfish act, and the 
speaker works to defend this position by stating that there is no ‘requirement financially, 
culturally or legally’ for people to have children. This is undoubtedly true, but it can equally 
be applied to the conception of all children, and thus it may be suggested that it is the nature 
of the family structure that will arise from a surrogacy arrangement that is the cause for 
concern (for example whether it will be a homosexual or heterosexual parented family, or a 
single or dual parented family), rather than surrogacy as a mode of conception in itself.  
 
What is interesting in this extract is how the construct of the rights of the child is used to 
build an emotive argument that surrogacy is an inappropriate mode of human reproduction. 
The speaker is not saying that surrogacy is unacceptable in his opinion per se, but rather he is 
saying that surrogacy is unacceptable because it ‘subordinates the right of a child to a 
lifestyle choice’. This is rhetorically powerful because it implies that children conceived in 
this fashion will be damaged and disadvantaged, and this is a rhetorical position against 
which it is difficult to argue. It also positions adults who chose to use surrogacy as doing 
harm to children.  
 
The key implication of the ideological position elaborated within extracts in this repertoire is 
that adults who make a ‘lifestyle choice’ and have children through surrogacy are ‘merely’ 
consumers – they have no real desire for children, but rather are just complimenting their 
‘lifestyle’ by adding children, and that this is not in the best interests of children. This type of 
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construction is not only offensive to parents who have their children through surrogacy, but it 
also has significant implications for the support that families formed through surrogacy 
receive, and the exclusion they may face as a result. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A key theme to emerge from the data was the normative understanding of family and 
reproduction that was evoked. For many speakers, there was a taken for granted 
understanding that a family consists of two parents - one mother and one father - who 
together have conceived their children without assistance. This is the image of family that 
framed much of the debate prior to the enactment of the Bill, and consequently non-
heterosexual parents and/or those who use assisted reproductive technology are depicted as 
unacceptable departures from this norm. Indeed, the notion that a family comprises two 
opposite-sex parents is so deeply rooted in Australian society that debate around the use of 
surrogacy by a single man or woman was missing from the data altogether.  
 
One clear implication of this highly normative account of families as it appeared in 
politician’s debates over the Bill was that it served to justify opposition to the use of 
surrogacy by non-heterosexual couples without the need to explicitly express disapproval in 
most instances. By drawing upon the interpretative repertoire of children’s best interests are 
served by having a mother and father, speakers were able to imply that two mothers or two 
fathers would be against the best interests of the children. Thus, speakers could position 
themselves in a way that showed them to be concerned with the welfare of the child (which is 
a rhetorically impenetrable position) rather than as ‘anti-gay’.  In this regard, the debate in the 
NSW parliament echoed themes from the Warnock Report on surrogacy in the UK. In her 
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analysis of the report, Burr (2000, p.109) suggests that the language of best interests is 
deployed in the Report to justify claims about the most suitable people to raise children, 
namely a ‘heterosexual couple living together in a stable relationship’. Burr claims that the 
language of best interests is used to reinforce a heteronormative family structure and a narrow 
definition of appropriate procreation.  
 
There are of course a number of ironies in the statements analysed in this chapter, not least 
beingthe fact that the speakers themselves often exploited the image of ‘the child’ to build an 
argument based on upholding children’s rights. For example, children were typically 
constructed as innocent and demanding of protection, and as having the potential to be 
damaged due to their parent’s selfish desires. Another irony is that building an argument 
against surrogacy on the imagery of children’s best interests is a delicate balancing act. By 
disallowing surrogacy, those whose arguments rely so strongly on the image of the symbolic 
child are, in fact, denying specific children an existence. At the same time, by focusing on the 
perils of non-normative families for children’s welfare, these same politicians are deflecting 
attention from the serious problems experienced by existing children in damaging (often two-
parent, heterosexual) families. 
 
A consistent feature arising from the analysis was the dilemmatic nature of the rhetoric 
surrounding children and their best interests. This was to be expected in political debate about 
a controversial social issue, but it was interesting to observe the range of binary positions that 
were adopted, each providing insight into the common-sense attitudes that circulate within 
Australian society. For example, children’s rights were contrasted with adult’s rights; parents 
were either ‘good’ and loving or ‘bad’ and neglectful; reproduction was either ‘natural’ or 
‘unnatural’; and the inability to have children was either medical or social. All these positions 
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are made up of essentially individualistic stances – a good parent, a child’s rights, an infertile 
woman – and within such an ideological framework, discussion of family is problematic. In 
other words, surrogacy was constructed as fulfilling an adult’s needs or creating a child, but 
absent from the ideology exhibited in this particular forum was the construction of surrogacy 
as family-formation.  The limited empirical research into surrogacy outcomes to date 
indicates that families formed through surrogacy are as functional and healthy as those 
formed in other ways, and that the quality of family life is what matters more than family 
structure (Golombok, 2000).  
 
It is important to point out that the analysis above is but one interpretation of the debate, not 
least because the approach taken was to focus on one specific aspect of the discourse, that of 
the ‘best interests of the child’. Similarly, a parliamentary debate demonstrates a very specific 
form of rhetoric conducted by a very specific group of people that may not necessarily be 
broadly representative of how surrogacy discourse is constructed in other settings. Through 
the conduit of the media, however, politicians are perhaps one of the most instrumental 
groups in shaping policy debate on controversial topics, particularly as has been the case with 
surrogacy, when changes to legislation are under consideration (Riggs & Due 2012). 
Therefore an understanding of how key decision makers build accounts either for or against a 
particular social issue has wider reach than the parliamentary chamber. The echoes of child 
welfare discourse in political settings that come from such sources as the surrogacy debates in 
the UK in the 1980s (Warnock, 1984), and contemporary discussions about child custody in 
Australia (Fogarty & Augoustinos, 2008), lend support to the assumption that consideration 
of the issues above has wider relevance. 
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What individuals really believe about surrogacy is not accessible from the approach adopted 
in this chapter, but what is critical is that the act of talking and constructing arguments around 
surrogacy very clearly influences society through the manufacture of laws. Hence, the way in 
which the topic is spoken about reflects the ways of talking that are socially available today, 
and also contributes to what will be socially available in the future as a result of the 
legislative changes. Thus, one of the ways that surrogacy is constructed is as a threat to the 
welfare of children and a challenge to the future of stable family relationships. Alternative 
constructions of surrogacy might centre on the best interests of the family unit, whatever 
form that might take, rather than the best interests of either adults or children as separate from 
their families.  
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